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THE ROLE OF THE PER DIEM ARGUMENT IN
PERSONAL INJURY SUITS
THOMAS L. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
With increasing frequency, appellate courts across the country are
being forced to decide the propriety of counsel for the plaintiff utilizing a
formula, or per diem approach, when discussing damages for pain and
suffering in closing argument. Until a few years ago, this technique seems
to have excited little attention, and to have generated few appeals. The
steady rise in automobile accidents, the increasing amount of personal
injury litigation, and the tendency of the courts to scrutinize carefully
every procedure that might detract from a fair trial, have combined to
bring this type of argument to the attention of the courts, with the result
that today, few other non-substantive techniques have commanded as
much appellate attention.
Like many other subjects in the personal injury field, the per diem
argument is viewed in one light by organizations representing defense
counsel, and in another light by the national organization representing
plantiffs' counsel. For example, the Defense Research Institute lauded a
Wisconsin decision that disapproved the per diem technique, and claimed
that the decision freed "thirty million Americans ...

of the threat of this

forensic gimmick." 1 A similar decision was not viewed as sanguinely by
NACCA, representing counsel for plaintiffs, which complained that this
"lamentable decision went far to leave the unassisted jury wrapped in a
Grand Banks fog." 2 Thus, the opposing forces have mobilized along
predictable lines, with claimants' attorneys praising the argument, and
defense counsel condemning its use.
Despite the controversy it has aroused, the per diem technique is still
a widely-used and frequently effective weapon in the arsenal of plaintiff's
counsel,. although a distinguished plaintiff's lawyer has advocated its
abandonment,' and other prominent plaintiff's advocates have turned their
ingenuity to the development of other persuasive procedures." Nevertheless, the continued and widespread use of the procedure during the trial of
civil suits demands that proper attention be given to its appropriateness in
achieving an intelligent and orderly resolution of civil litigation. The purpose of this article is to probe the historical background of the procedure,
* A.B., Dartmouth College; LL. B., University of Pittsburgh.
1. 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 189 n.3 (1961).
2. 25 NACCA L.J. 60, 68 (1960).
3. LEv nE, PERSONAL IJWuay ANNUAL (1965).
4. SAms, PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL (1963); APPELMAN, PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL
(1962).
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and to weigh and balance the arguments of both the advocates and of
the critics of the technique. Since the per diem argument is a persuasive
device whose effectiveness is difficult to evaluate, no consideration will
be given to the question of whether or not resourceful counsel should
resort to its use. This article will deal only with the question of whether
or not the per diem argument has an appropriate role to play in the fair
disposition of our civil litigation.
The controversy has arisen out of two basic and typical situations. The
first, and most common, is the use by counsel, ordinarily representing the
plaintiff, of a formula in his closing argument to the jury. The formula can
comprise either a statement by counsel of his belief as to the value of the
pain and suffering experienced during a given time period, such as per
hour or day, combined with a suggestion that the figures be used in a
formula for calculating the damages, or it can consist merely of a suggestion by counsel, without the expression of his personal opinion as to value,
that the jury base their evaluation on some per diem figure in conjunction
with a formula. As used in the ordinary case, the technique involves two
distinct suggestions-an amount and a method of computation. The other
situation arises when the jury, or judge sitting as fact-finder, actually employs this technique, with or without encouragement by counsel.5 The
latter situation will not be considered in this article.
The classic example of this argument is presented in Belli, Modern
Trials, 1963 (Abridged Edition). The technique, as utilized and popularized by Mr. Belli, has been described by him below:
Rather than start at an absolute figure, let us start at the other
end and break pain and suffering into finite amounts. We do this
by showing the line, "1952 to 1982," as being plaintiff's life line,
his thirty years. We break this down into days, hours and
seconds. If one will, there are 31,536,000 seconds in a year.
(Counsel may multiply this times a thirty-year life expectancy).... When it is broken down into seconds and minutes,
then a jury begins to realize the real meaning of this permanent
pain and suffering of which doctors have spoken, and that
$60,000 at $5 a day, is not an excessive award ....

Jurors must

start thinking in days, minutes and seconds and in $5, $3, and
$2 so that they can multiply to the absolute figure. Perhaps a
juror will feel that $5 a day is not enough, that it should be
$10 a day. A juror may believe it should be $4 or $3 a day. At
least he has started thinking, and when he follows this system
of multiplication he comes to a substantial figure that must be
fair, because it is as factual as we can go.'
5. 60 M ct. L. REv. 612 (1962).
6. BELLI, MODERN TRIALS 345-346 (abridged ed. 1963).
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At the bottom of the controversy over the use of this technique lies a
fundamental policy consideration. Basically, the courts confronted with
the question of the propriety of the formula approach have to resolve the
far more rudimentary question of whether the traditional practice of curtly
telling the jury that the test of damages for pain and suffering is a
"reasonable amount" remains the best of a bad assortment of alternatives,
or whether counsel should be permitted to deal in specific measurements
of time and value, and to conduct a more far-reaching inquiry.7
The vagueness of the traditional measure of damages communicated
to the jury by the court in its charge, and presumably used by the jury
in the final determination of its award, itself raises concomitant policy
considerations. A fundamental question arises as to whether or not it is
fair to permit the potentially large sums of money frequently involved
in personal injury cases to be subject to the ambiguities and insufficiencies
of the traditional standard." The victim of a tragic and permanently
incapacitating injury who finds himself in a court using the traditional
standard may find his economic future being decided by a jury that has
been enjoined by the court to give a "reasonable" award, but which has
been given no criterion to assist in the decision-making. If the jury is
sufficiently sympathetic, the plaintiff in such a situation may be the
beneficiary of the jury's largesse; if offended by some quirk of his
personality, the jury may award him his "special" damages but no fair
compensation for the misery he has experienced, and which may even have
produced the personality defect. In either case, the verdict is basically
"unreasonable" because it is a product of guesswork and whimsy rather
than a rationalized figure.
A second consideration, also central to any intelligent analysis of the per
diem technique, revolves around the question of whether or not a tortfeasor, having inflicted the harm for which damages are sought, should
be permitted to deny the victim of his wrong a possibly appropriate
and valuable tool. It is only after the jury has decided the initial question
of responsibility that it is forced to decide the question of damages. Thus,
by the time the jury considers the validity of the per diem argument made
by counsel, it has already made up its mind that the defendant's negligence produced the injury. At this point, it could be argued, the injured
party should have the benefit of any procedure that can assist the jury
in assessing an award against the responsible party. Traditionally, the
law provides that a party whose misconduct renders the ascertainment of
precise damages difficult cannot complain of the uncertainty. 9
These two considerations are frequently overlooked or ignored by the
7. Ratner v. Arrington, III So. 2d 83 (FIa. 1959).
8. 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 39 (1954).
9. Annot. 60 A.L.R. 2d 1331, 1348 (1958).
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courts required to pass upon the validity of the technique. In some cases,
the courts have been diverted by a confusion of the per diem approach
with the "Golden Rule" argument, which has been almost universally
condemned. This confusion is exemplified in a number of the early
Pennsylvania cases, which will be discussed infra. In other cases, the
courts have mustered a host of flimsy and superficial reasons in support of
their decision to reject the use of the argument, while the actual motivation
of the court is the unspoken but real fear that use of the formula technique
will have a mesmeric effect on juries, and lead to excessive awards.Y This
last consideration is perhaps the principal objection to the use of the
formula technique, even though it is rare that this argument is articulated
by the courts.
In the subsequent sections of this article, the historical sources of the
controversy will be considered, as well as the arguments mustered by
both sides. A thorough review of the existing case law will indicate the
magnitude of the divergence of opinion, and the manner in which the
courts have dealt with, and frequently by-passed, an analysis of the considerations discussed above.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Until the early 1950's, the per diem argument, as well as other blackboard techniques of persuasion, had received little appellate attention.'1
Prior to 1951, the propriety of the per diem argument had been considered
only by the appellate courts of Pennsylvania, which had followed a
consistent policy proscribing use of the formula technique. 2 Other states
apparently were not bedeviled by the problems raised when the technique
was used, although this situation quickly changed after 1951.
In the 1950's more and more cases involving the per diem technique
began to appear on the dockets of the appellate courts. This sudden
emergence of the procedure as a substantial issue on appeal was due to a
number of factors; the most important of these undoubtedly was the
increased use of the technique due to the encouragement of men like Mr.
Belli and other leaders in NACCA, which was evolving into a powerful
spokesman for plaintiff's lawyers at the time. Since then, few other nonsubstantive problems have commanded as much attention from our
appellate courts.
Several generalizations can be made about the early Pennsylvania
decisions, before they are reviewed in detail. The Pennsylvania courts
of that by-gone era, in decisions reflecting the conservatism of the age,
arrogated to itself a broad supervisory power over jury verdicts. Though
10. 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 189, 191 (1961).
11. BELLI, MODERN TRIus 327 (abridged ed. 1963).

12. 41 B.U.L. REv. 432 (1961).
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paying lip service to the authority of the jury to render a fair award, the
courts made it clear that the award had to be reasonable, and that the
reasonableness of the award was to be decided, in the final analysis, by
the appellate courts. Shining through the early Pennsylvania decisions is
the unspoken fear of the courts that juries could not be trusted, and that
severe limitations had to be placed on their ability to award plaintiffs
large sums of money for such essentially indefinable items as pain and
suffering.
In addition, the early Pennsylvania decisions reflect the intertwining of
the "Golden Rule" argument and the per diem technique that was
mentioned previously, and the confusion of thought that arises when a
court does not distinguish these two distinct arguments. This intermingling of two essentially similar but separate persuasive techniques is
manifested in the early Pennsylvania decisions in two ways. Thus, in
some decisions, the courts explicity confused the per diem technique with
the "Golden Rule" argument, and condemned the per diem technique on
the ground that it is improper to suggest that the jury stand in the shoes
of the plaintiff in assessing damages for pain and suffering. (The Golden
Rule argument.) In the majority of cases, the courts confused the two
arguments in a far more subtle fashion. Running like a red thread
through many of these early decisions is a serious semantical discussion,
continuously carried on by the courts, in an attempt to distinguish the
concept of "compensation" from the concept of "worth" or "price."
Basically, the courts regarded "compensation" as the correct phrase to be
used when discussing damages for pain and suffering, on the ground that
compensation connoted the idea of an allowance that a stoical jury was to
give to an injured plaintiff for the injury and misery he sustained. On the
other hand, the phrases "prices" or "worth" were considered pejorative,
presumably because they invited the jury to think of pain as an item that
could be bought and sold. Apparently, the courts feared that if the jury
thought of pain and suffering in terms of the market place, the jury
would place itself in the shoes of the injured plaintiff and would award
the amount that it would take for the plaintiff's pain. In a subtle and
indirect form, this semantical distinction is the "Golden Rule" argument
repeating itself.
Collins v. Leafey 1S is commonly cited as the first Pennsylvania case
dealing with the per diem argument. However, like the scores of cases
coming after it, the Collins case is only part of an evolutionary process
whereby the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined its conception of the
measure of damages to be allowed for pain and suffering. Nevertheless,
even though not explicitly condemning the per diem practice, the court,
in Collins and the cases following it, left no doubt that it would not
13. 124 Pa. 203, 16 At. 765 (1889).
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approve the technique. But it was not until Bullock v. Chester & Daily
Telford Road Co.,14 decided in 1921, that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court first came to grips with the underlying rationale of the per diem
approach, and expressed its criticism of the conceptual basis of the argument.
In Collins, the court criticized the charge of the lower court, not because
it represented a distorted interpretation of the applicable law, but because
the lower court had not forcefully impressed the jury that their award
was to be limited only to compensation. The court itself made no attempt
to define compensation. Indeed, the lower court had instructed the jury
that their verdict was to be compensatory. Apparently, however, the
court felt that one iteration of the word was not enough to overcome the
possible generosity of the jury toward the plaintiff.
The oversight of the court in Collins, in failing to define "compensation"
as the standard for an award for pain and suffering, was repaired by
subsequent decisions of that court. Starting with Baker v. Pennsylvania
Co.,'. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began a semantical discussion of
the meaning of this term which was to culminate in its drawing an
elaborate distinction between "compensation" and "price" or "worth,"
and then end with the court eradicating the artificial distinction so
laboriously worked out in this long line of cases.
The Baker case is interesting because of its historical role in the
development of Pennsylvania's position in opposition to the per diem
technique. The decision sharply distinguishes compensation from price or
worth, and condemns the latter terms when used in defining the standard
of damages. It explicitly and implicitly confuses the "Golden Rule" argument with the per diem technique. Finally, it completely asserts the
supervisory power of the court over jury verdicts.
In Baker, the lower court had instructed the jury that:
It is of course difficult to give a money value to pain and
suffering. No person would voluntarily endure such pain and
suffering as it is proven Mrs. Baker endured, for any amount of
money. But it is the duty of the jury, if they find for the plaintiff,
to fix some
sum which would be compensation for this pain and
6

suffering.'

In condemning this apparently innocuous instruction, the court drew a
sharp distinction, for the first time, between "price" and "compensation:"
There is no market in which the price of a voluntary sub14. 270 Pa. 295, 113 Ad. 379 '(1921).
15.142 Pa. 503, 21 At. 979 (1891).
16. 142 Pa. at 503, 21 At. at 980.
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jection of one's self to pain and suffering can be fixed. There is
no market standard of value to be applied, and to suggest the
idea of price to be paid to a volunteer as an approximation to
the money value of suffering is to give loose rein to sympathy
and caprice ....

From the whole case, the question is, what is

a reasonable allowance for the suffering necessarily endured?' 7
In Goodhart v. Pennsylvania Co.,'" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
continued the semantical debate that was begun in Baker and repeated
the distinction drawn in Baker in more clear-cut terms. Its language,
although not directed to the per diem approach, clearly would proscribe
the use of this technique by plaintiff's counsel:
An instruction that leaves the jury to regard it as an independent item of damages to be compensated by a sum of money
that may be regarded as a pecuniary equivalent is not only
inexact, but it is erroneous. The word "compensation," in the
phrase, "compensation for pain and suffering," is not be be
understood as meaning price, or value, but as describing an
allowance looking towards recompense for, or made because of,
the suffering consequent upon the injury.' 9
In Schenkel v. Traction Co.,2" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized that the Goodhart decision, instead of clarifying the law, had
produced more confusion, and undertook to make more explicit the
meaning of the earlier decision. The court quickly dispelled the belief
nurtured by the Goodhart decision that pain and suffering had been
abolished as a separate item of damages. 2 Instead, the court indicated
that Goodhart was designed to still the growing practice of "suggesting
to the jury as a measure of damages what amount of money they or any
other third party would individually take to submit to an injury similar to
the one before him,"2 2 i.e. the "Golden Rule" argument. If the court had
stopped there, the decision would stand as a condemnation of the per diem
idea only inferentially. However, the court went further, and after
stressing compensation as the test in measuring the award for pain and
suffering, interpreted Goodhart as condemning any consideration of pain
and suffering as an item "having a fixed value or equivalent of a market
price."" In this language, as well as that in Goodhart, the court struck at
the assumption underlying the per diem technique, that pain and suffering
can be equated to a fixed value.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

142
177
177
194
194
194
194

Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.
Pa.

at 505, 21 At. at 980.
1, 35 AtI. 191 (1896).
at 2, 35 At. at 192.
182, 44 At. 1072 (1899).
at 185-186,44 At. at 1073.
at 185, 44 Aft. at 1073.
at 185, 44 At. at 1073.
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The importance that the court attached to the distinction between
"compensation" and "price" or "worth" is apparent in its later decision
of McClane v. Pittsburgh Railways Co. 4 In McClane, the lower court
had instructed the jury that, "As a result of the injury you will allow Mr.
McClane compensation for the pain and suffering he has undergone from
June 1903, to the present time, and also the present worth of pain, if any
is likely to be suffered in the future."2 5 Instead of analyzing the difficult
legal issue presented by the lower court's charge, the court ignored it and
reverted to its fascination with the compensation-price dispute. The charge
itself presented the court with the opportunity to resolve the difficult issue
of whether damages for future pain and suffering should be reduced to
present worth. Although the majority of the cases dealing with the problem
have declined to require such a reduction, 6 there have been persuasive
arguments made in its favor. Instead of dealing with this issue, the
court's attention was drawn instinctively to the lower court's use of the
word "worth." Therefore, instead of an intelligent consideration of the
problem of reducing future damages for pain and suffering to present
worth, the court's opinion substitutes an exercise in linguistics which is
summed up in the following sentences:
Compensation expresses a thought easily grasped, however difficult it may be to work it out in practical results. Worth is the
quality of a thing which gives it value, and is easily comprehended. The two words are not equivalent, and we have no right
to suppose that the jury would so regard them. Except as otherwise instructed, the average juror's understanding of worth
would associate it with the idea of cost or price18
Twenty years after McClane, and forty years after Baker, the distinction that these cases had etched out with such painful precision was
erased in Herb v. Hallowell.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the
Herb case, did not formally overrule Baker and its successors, instead, it
expanded the concept of compensation until the idea of price or worth was
absorbed into it. Faced with a lower court charge that instructed the
jury to determine what the pain and suffering of the plaintiffs was "worth,"
and with the conflict with the Baker-McClane terminology that this
charge produced, the court reconciled the conflict by stating that:
It is, of course, the duty of the trial judge to make it clear to the
jury that in awarding damages for pain and suffering the award
must be limited "to compensation and compensation alone."
24. 230 Pa. 29, 79 Ad. 237 (1911).

25. 230 Pa. at 29, 79 AtI. at 237.
26. 25 C.J.S., Damages § 93 (1966).
27. 43 MnN. L. REv. 832, 836 (1959).

28. 230 Pa. at 34-35, 79 At. at 238.
29. 304 Pa. 128, 154 At. 582 (1931).

1966-1967]

THE PER DIEM ARGUMENT

Collins v. Leafey, 124 Pa. 203, 214. Though "compensation" is
an approved word in instructions in cases of this kind, it is not
an infallible guide to a just verdict. Jurors may differ widely in
their conception of the word "compensation." One juror might
hold that no amount of money could justly compensate one for
acute pain and suffering; another might hold that even a small
sum of money would be just compensation in such a case. "Compensation" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary
as "amends; an equivalent of recompense; that which makes
good the lack or variation of something else. Among the synonyms set out are 'recompense, satisfaction, set-off.' " Appellant
objects particularly to that part of the charge which says: "Consider the testimony carefully and see what you think the pain
and suffering of Mr. Herb and his wife, and little boy, are
worth." Appellant argues that this is "error in that it places a
price or money equivalent upon pain and suffering." This is
rather close to what a plaintiff is seeking when he asks reasonable monetary compensation for pain and suffering. While it may
be inappropriate to use "price" in connection with pain and suffering, for price is something else, yet "price" is also defined in
Webster's New International Dictionary as a "recompense,"
which, as we noted above, is a dictionary synonym for "compensation." . . . While the word "price" or "worth" in instructions
as to damages for pain and suffering has been condemned and
the use of the word "compensation" has been approved. . . , it is
a matter of observation that few philologists get on juries. We
believe that only a philologist would appreciate the difference
between the word "compensation" and the word "price" or
"worth" as used in instructions to be considered by juries in
assessing damages for the elements referred to.30
With this curt observation, the court laid to rest a distinction that
was the handiwork of forty years of case law.
The Pennsylvania cases discussed in the preceding paragraphs usually
are considered to be the earliest judicial repudiation of the per diem
technique. The quotations reproduced demonstrate, however, that the
court was preoccupied with the language of the court's instructions
concerning pain and suffering, rather than with an argument that had
been used by counsel in his closing argument. However, when read together and in the context of contemporaneous cases, they leave little
doubt that the per diem technique was not proper argument in a Pennsylvania court. For instance, in another series of cases the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court condemned counsel's reference to the ad damnum clause
30. 304 Pa. at 133-135, 154 At. at 584-85.
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of the complaint." And in two decisions reported in 1921, the court, by
way of dicta, criticized the practice of counsel's suggesting fixed amounts
for intangible items of damage. In Joyce v. Smith,3 2 the court said: "The
amount of damages claimed is not to be determined by an estimate of
counsel, but by the jury from the evidence before them, and any sugges33
tion to the jury of an arbitrary amount is highly improper ....
Finally, in Bullock v. Chester & Darby Telford Road Co.,3 4 the court
expressed its conviction that "The verdict in an action for tort should be
a deduction drawn by the jury from the evidence and not a mere formal
adoption of calculations submitted by counsel. . .. ""
None of the cases that have been analyzed to this point deal with the
per diem technique in a definite manner. However, they do justify the
supposition, commonly-held, that prior to 1951 the per diem argument had
been condemned only by the appellate courts of Pennsylvania.
The per diem argument remained in this state of uncontroversial uncertainty for several years after 1951. In subsequent decisions, other states
critized the technique in a more direct fashion than the earlier Pennsylvania cases, and the popularizers of the technique continued to encourage
its use. For instance, on June 2, 1951, Melvin Belli lectured on the subject
before the Mississippi Bar Association. It has been stated that this was
the first time the argument was proposed east of the Mississippi, but
this seems improbable in view of the consideration given to variations of
the technique by the Pennsylvania courts.36 Nevertheless, it remained
for the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in its 1958 decision in Botta v.
Brunner,37 to lay the foundation for the current controversy over the use
of a mathematical formula.
In Botta, the Supreme Court of New Jersey introduced most of the arguments that have been used by later decisions criticizing the per diem technique. The Botta opinion is undoubtedly the earliest definitive treatment
of the subject; so determined was the court to deal fully with the issue that
it requested supplemental briefs from counsel "in order to deal more fully
with a problem which is currently vexing the trial courts. . . ."" In order
31. See, e.g., Resse v. Hervey, 163 Pa. 253, 29 At!. 907 (1894); Hollinger v. York
Railways Co., 225 Pa. 419, 74 Atl. 344 (1909); Carothers v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.,
229 Pa. 558, 79 At!. 134 (1911).
32. 269 Pa. 439, 112 At!. 549 (1921).
33. 269 Pa. at 443, 112 At. at 551.
34. 270 Pa. 295, 113 At. 379 (1921).
35. 270 Pa. at 298, 113 At. at 380.
-36. MoRRis,

DAMAGES
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AND

WRONGFUL

DEATH

REVIEW OF THE 'PER Dim' ARGUMENT-JUNE 2, 1951 TO DATE" 287'(1965).:

37. 20 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
38. 20 N.J. at 84, 138 A.2d at 715.

CASES,

"A

1966-1967]

THE PER DIEM ARGUMENT

to reach this issue, the court even ignored an obvious ground for reversal
which would have by-passed the per diem issue. Counsel for plaintiff had
argued to the jury that ".

.

. you must place yourself in the position of

this woman."3 9 Unlike the Pennsylvania court, the New Jersey Supreme
Court recognized this argument as an issue separate from the use of the
per diem formula, and even disapproved the statement on the basis of
prior New Jersey law. However, the court ignored this obvious ground for
reversal in order to "base our disposition of the appeal on a more extensive
treatment of the problem"4 ° which it felt was demanded by the "sufficient
current urgency"' of the problem.
In disposing of the problem, the court advanced three major arguments
against the formula approach. The greatest emphasis was placed on the
fact that the monetary valuations used in the formula had no foundation
in the evidence, and would not have been received in evidence even if an
expert could be found who might provide such testimony. In adopting this
view, the court placed itself in direct conflict with the Appellate Division,
which in the opinion appealed from, had felt that the argument was a
proper inference that counsel should be permitted to argue. Incidental
to this point, the court stressed that any monetary valuations necessarily
had to be speculative, and would not take into account the variations in the
pain thresholds in different individuals. Finally, the court declared that the
argument was inequitable to defense counsel, who presumably had no way
of coping with it.
The court buttressed these arguments with a full-scale discussion of all
of the Pennsylvania cases cited previously in this article, leaving the unmistakable impression that Pennsylvania had repeatedly repudiated the
per diem technique. It also alluded to statements made by Belli in his
Mississippi lecture, and to some extent the fervor of the opinion seems to
have been motivated by the court's distaste for Mr. Belli's suggestions.
In spite of the spirited and analytical approach which the court applied
in considering the mathematical argument, the opinion is a disappointment
because of what is left after the disposal of the per diem technique. The
court concluded its opinion with a reaffirmation of the traditional instruction that the jury is to award "fair and reasonable compensation" for pain
and suffering, apparently feeling that it was not necessary to inquire any
further into the adequacy of this phrase in providing a guideline for a jury
to translate broken bones into dollars and cents.
Publication of the Botta opinion drew the attention of the legal world
to the problem, and a rash of law review articles quickly appeared analyzing the implications of the decision. The majority of these articles were
39. 20 N.J. at 87, 138 A.2d at 718.
40. 20 N.J. at 88, 138 A.2d at 719.
41. 20 N.J. at 86, 138 A.2d at 717.

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:393

openly hostile to the Botta decision, and the reasoning underlying it.42
In addition, more and more appellate courts have found themselves confronted with the issue, and a sharp divergence in judicial outlook has
resulted. At present, probably more courts have ignored the reasoning
of Botta than have followed it. Without outlining qualifications that might
have been imposed, the following states have approved the per diem approach: Texas, Michigan, Nevada, Utah, Washington, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, Florida, Maryland, Kentucky, Iowa, Arkansas,
Colorado, California and Minnesota.4 3 One state, Oklahoma, has given
a very reluctant and heavily qualified approval.4 4 Following Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, the following states have disapproved the technique:
Kansas, North Dakota, Delaware, Missouri, West Virginia, Virginia,
Illinois, Hawaii, New York, Wisconsin and New Hampshire.4"
In the succeeding section of this article, consideration will be given to
the reasoning advanced by the critics and by the proponents of the mathematical formula, and the arguments underpinning the cases cited above
will be explored.
THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE
PER DIEM CONTROVERSY
In the decisions and publications discussed in the preceding section of
this article, most of the implications of the per diem technique were subjected to close scrutiny. The detractors of the per diem argument have
voiced their objections to it repeatedly, and the proponents of the tech42. See, e.g., 43 MiNN. L. REV. 832 (1959); 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 380 (1958); 38 N.C. L.
REv. 289 (1960); 33 So. CAL. L. REV. 24 (1959); 4 ViLL. L. REV. 137 (1958).
43. Wright v. Chandler, 231 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. 1950); Yates v. Wenk, 363 Mich. 311,
109 N.W.2d 828 (1961); Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 432, 345 P.2d 754 (1959); Olsen v.

Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 574 (1960); Jones v. Hogan, 56
Wash.2d 23, 351 P.2d 153 (1960); Four-County Electric Power Ass'n v. Clardy, 221 Miss.
403, 73 So. 2d 144 (1945); Clark v. Hudson, 265 Ala. 630, 93 So. 2d 138 (1956); Edwards

v. Lawton, 136 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. 1964); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1959);
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nique have written extensively in its defense. The issues presented by the
use of the argument have been so clearly defined by the incessant debate
that it was possible for Chief Judge Carrol, the author of the opinion in
Ratner v. Arrington,46 to enumerate in systematic order the arguments
presented by each side. Repetition of the arguments has not stilled the
debate, however, and the impression is left that most of the decisions are
not the result so much of cerebral activity as they are the product of the
unconscious reaction of the court to the possibility of prejudice resulting
from use of the argument.
Underlying the objections advanced by the detractors of the technique
is an implicit distrust of the jury's reaction to it. This distrust is nurtured
by a belief that the technique, when used by skillful plaintiff's counsel,
will not only dupe the twelve members of the jury, with its apparent logic,
but that defense counsel is powerless to combat the injustice that will
result. This assumption was pointed out by Justice Solfisburg, in his dissenting opinion in Caley v. Manicke,47 when he stated that:
The criticism of the so-called per diem argument is grounded in
an inherent distrust of the adversary system of jury trials. While
such distrust is not new, the detractors of this system have failed
to provide a more satisfactory substitute.
Bottoming most of the arguments presented by the proponents of the
techinque is a deep dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of the present
standard for determining damages for pain and suffering. Underlying
their approach to the problem is the assumption that counsel should be
permitted to explore the subject in depth, and that there is at least as much
injustice inherent in the flaccid phrase presently used to measure such
damages as inheres in the per diem argument.
These two conflicting values lie at the center of the debate over the use
of this technique. On the one hand, it is contended that wide latitude
should be permitted counsel in his closing argument, and that any limitation imposed on his ability to argue fully the damages to be awarded for
pain and suffering strikes at a precious prerogative of counsel. On the
other hand, it is claimed that the court has a duty to confine the arguments
closely to the evidence presented, and that when counsel enters an area
of argumentation which involves the sympathetic reaction of the jury to
the plaintiff's injury, and possible resulting prejudice to the Aefendant,
the court must maintain a watchful eye and a strict hand to obviate injustice.
In opposing the use of the per diem technique, its detractors have not
rested their case on the advantages of the present standard. In fact, they
46. 111 So. 2d 82 (1959).
47. 24 III. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
48. Id. at 210-211.
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have said very little in defense of the present system of measuring such
damages merely by informing the jury that they must award "fair and
reasonable compensation." The only praise that has been expressed for
the present standard, by the courts criticizing the per diem technique,
appears in Caley v. Manicke,49 and indicates the difficulty that is involved
in defending the present method. In that case, the court eulogized the
present test for such damages as "a determination reached by a subjective
process which is easier to comprehend than to define.... "50
The critics of the per diem technique, instead of resting their argument
on a comparison with the present method, have relied on three major
contentions. Basically, the opponents of the technique have attacked it on
a procedural basis, combining this with a criticism of the factual assumptions of the technique, and a declaration of the possible ways prejudice
can result to defense counsel.
The argument most frequently repeated by the critics of the per diem
technique is that the numerical portions of the formula used by plaintiff's
counsel go beyond the scope of the evidence presented. They reason that
traditional procedural principles require counsel to confine his argument
to testimony in the record, and that the figures adduced by plaintiff's
counsel are arbitrary, speculative, and outside the ambit of the record. 5'
Therefore, they conclude that the argument is procedurally unsound.
Closely aligned with this argument is a subsidiary and supporting
contention. Criticism has been leveled against the per diem technique
on the ground that no expert would be permitted to testify to the figures
that are presented by plaintiff's counsel in his closing argument. Therefore, the per diem technique is deemed to permit counsel for plaintiff
to do by argument what he cannot do by way of evidence. 2
In countering this argument, the supporters of the per diem technique
claim that its detractors misconstrue the scope of the latitude that is
given to counsel in closing argument. They point out that counsel, in
closing, can discuss many issues that are not proper matters for admission into evidence. For instance, they argue, counsel can comment on
the credibility of witnesses, or draw the conclusion that a defendant was
negligent, but these matters could not be made part of the evidentiary
basis of the case. Traditionally, counsel is permitted not only to argue
the evidence in the record, but all inferences flowing from it.53 Their rebuttal is best summarized in the words of one writer, who concisely
stated the case in favor of the per diem argument:
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Ibid.
Ibid.
11 DEFENSE L.J. 10 (1962).
4 VIL. L. REv. 137, at 139 (1958).
12 RUTGERS L. REv. 522 (1958).
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The argument that the evidence fails to provide a foundation for
the per diem suggestion is similarly unconvincing. All concede
that the jury must observe, weigh and then ultimately equate
the evidence of pain with a monetary sum, but this same evidence is said not to contain a basis for inference by counsel of a
total or per diem worth. 4
In addition to attacking the per diem technique on procedural grounds,
the foes of the argument have assailed the factual assumptions underlying
the technique. They point out that the technique presupposes a constant
amount of pain over a stated period of time, which must be compensated
at a uniform rate, and contend that this assumption does not conform to
the true nature of pain. They argue that pain thresholds differ from
individual to individual, and that the per diem technique treats all pain
equally. The argument is fallacious they claim, because it does not take
into account the fact that pain diminishes with time, varies from day
to day, can be overshadowed in individuals by the distraction of other
events, and overlooks the ability of persons to adapt to pain. 5
As a corollary to these arguments, some critics of the per diem technique take an additional step and claim that pain, by its very nature, has
no numerical value, cannot be interchanged with money, and therefore
cannot be measured by a fixed standard or formula. 6 This position
prompted one writer to remark that some critics of the per diem technique
would appear to favor abolition of damages for pain and suffering altogether."
In rejoinder to these views, the proponents of the argument have taken
several positions. One point of view disagrees with the description of
how pain is supposedly experienced, and argues that:
...[P]ain is often experienced not in a sudden subsiding flash
but in pain-streaked minutes, hours, and a gray succession of
days or in a throbbing, ceaseless chain reaction. If pain is endured moment by moment, day by day, why should not the jury
determine damages to compensate for such pain by allotting X
amount to each moment, each day, each link in the chain of
pain? 58
More prosaically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has pointed out that the
54. 19 OMo ST. L.J. 780, at 782 (1958).

55. See, e.g., Henne v. Balick, 146 A.2d 394 (Del. 1958); Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 26
(W.Va. 1961).
56. Affett v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transportation Co., 11 Wis. 2d 604, 106,N.W.2d
274 (1960).
57. Grossnickle v. Village of Germantown, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 2d 96,. 209 N.E.2d 422
(1965).
58. 29 NACCA L.J. 187, at 189 (1962).
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loss of a part of the body or the permanent interruption of normal
activities, is a constant source of suffering. 9
In answer to the other parts of this argument, it has been pointed out
that the jury can accommodate the gradual diminution of pain to the
formula approach by using a declining rate."0 In addition, the proponents of the technique criticize these attacks as trivial, and feel that the
acumen of the jury is badly underrated by the opponents of the technique
in presenting this line of argument. They point out that it would be
perfectly proper for defense counsel to make these arguments to the
jury, and that the jury would be in a position to give proper consideration to them.
The corollary that is drawn by many critics of the per diem technique
has come under heavy attack from the argument's supporters. They point
out the lack of logic in stating that pain has no numerical value, and
cannot be interchanged with money in the face of the fact that the jury
must act as though the opposite were true.6" The point has been made
that the defendant is not in a position to attack the factual assumptions
behind the formula approach, and to stress the variability and inexactness of pain, because the defendant caused the injury. "Relief given
to an injured plaintiff can only be approximate. But a defendant whose
negligence has caused the plaintiff's injury cannot be heard to complain
that such damages cannot be ascertained with exactness."6
Finally, the proponents of the technique claim that:
The very absence of a fixed standard by which pain can be
measured and translated into compensation by a jury is a persuasive reason why counsel should be permitted to illustrate to
the jury the manner in which he arrived at the total sum claimed
63
for pain and suffering.
The arguments discussed above represent a rationalized facade covering probably the most significant objection of the formula approach.
This objection stems from the concern that use of the technique prejudices defense counsel, and unerringly leads to astronomical personal
injury awards. Although this hidden motivation is left unarticulated in
many of the opinions, it is possible to analyze the premises of the objection.
Several of the cases rejecting the per diem approach have bitterly
condemned it on the ground that it is a clever strategy devised solely to
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
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mesmerize juries and produce large verdicts. These denunciations range
from the relatively mild statements in Henne v. Balick,64 to the effect
that the argument gets figures before the jury that they would otherwise not have considered, to the more vitriolic expressions in Caylor v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,65 where the court said: "The purpose of this technique is blatantly to achieve the 'more adequate award,'
a synonym to all but the naive for 'the more than adequate award.' )66
The concern that use of the per diem argument will lead to higher
personal injury awards is predicated on three objections to the technique. Initially, it has been claimed that the argument is a powerful
appeal to the prejudices and sympathies of the jury. This contention has
been expressed most aptly in Crum v. Ward,67 where the court said:
Practical, psychological and philosophical factors do enter the
picture. The power of suggestion, and its immeasurable effects,
are well known. To merely suggest the existence of pain and suffering, especially pain and suffering of a fellow human being,
engenders or activates such complex emotions as sympathy,
prejudice, compassion and caprice that exist in every normal
person, including each of the twelve jurors, and creates a fervent,
resolute desire to relieve or aid the sufferer. The effects of such
a suggestion are greatly enhanced or multiplied when made by
the action of the trial judge in telling the jury, which he
effectively does by approving or permitting the argument, that
the suggestion of a money value of pain and suffering is a reasonable argument and is justifiable, notwithstanding the complete
absence of facts related to money value thereof. 8
One writer expressed this conviction more mundanely, claiming that the
per diem technique is used along with all the other "hidden persuaders"
that characterize the "Hollywood-type trial."69
In addition, it has been claimed that higher personal injury awards will
result from use of the technique because it discourages the jury from
thinking about damages for pain and suffering, and encourages them to
accept the figures supplied by counsel.7 ° For instance, in Caley v.
Manicke,"' the court criticized the formula approach on the ground that
64. 164 A.2d 394 (Del. 1958).
65. 138 Kan. 210, 368 P.2d 28 (1962).

66. Id. at 55.
67. 122 S.E.2d 18 (W.Va. 1961).
68. Id. at 26-27.
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a formula is by definition a conventional rule or method for doing something, and as such, would lend little enlightenment to the jury.
Climaxing these arguments is the frequently repeated plaint that the
per diem technique places counsel for defendant in a difficult dilemma,
which prevents him from coping with the argument. Critics of the technique claim that counsel for defendant is faced with the alternatives of
not arguing the point, and implying that he cannot refute counsel's suggestion, or of arguing the point, and fortifying the implication that the
law recognizes pain and suffering as capable of being evaluated on a per
diem basis. 2
In reply, the advocates of the technique contend that the claimed
prejudice to defense counsel is questionable.7" They point out that there
is nothing to prevent counsel for defendant from either suggesting a lower
unit value than used by plaintiff's counsel, to suggest a different method
for calculating damages, or to argue the weaknesses and inappropriateness of the formula approach.74 It has also been suggested that the idea
that pain and suffering can be measured in money may have value to
defense counsel, presumably by disclosing and making subject to argu75
ment the figures that might be awarded for this item of damages.
The advocates of the technique have vehemently denied that the use
of the argument leads to exorbitant awards by pointing to the barriers
that stand in the way of an excessive verdict. They claim that the argument is not binding on the jury, which is free to reject or to accept it, and
that the court will indicate in its instructions that the unit valuations are
not evidence, but merely opinions tendered by counsel. They argue that
the danger of large verdicts is exaggerated, and that experience with
the per diem technique does not bear out the fear that it produces excessive awards. It is noteworthy that in many of the reported decisions
dealing with the formula, defense counsel raised its use as a point on
appeal, but did not argue the excessiveness of the verdict. 76 No statistics
have been kept that would justify the assertion that higher verdicts
result from use of the technique. Even if an occasional unjustifiable award
does result, it is still subject to the supervisory control of the trial court,
or an appellate court, which have the ability to reduce a verdict for
77
excessiveness.

In addition, it has been claimed that the per diem technique is a two
edged sword, which must be handled gingerly by counsel for plaintiff.
72.
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Juries know that the valuations in the formula are the opinions of counsel,
and that counsel has an interest in the outcome of the litigation. If the
unit valuations impress the jury as unreasonable, the plaintiff's counsel
suggesting them runs the risk of the jury ignoring them, or worse, penalizing the plaintiff for greed.7"
In contrast to the critics, the proponents of the per diem technique rest
their case, to a large extent, on a denunciation of the inadequacies in the
present method of arriving at damages for pain and suffering. In addition
to countering the objections noted above, they have subjected the present
test of damages to close analysis, and court after court has been swayed
by the fact that the traditional test gives the jury very little guidance.
It has been condemned on the ground that it requires the jury to reach
its award through a process of intuition which has no rational basis. It
has been said that, although life is lived in unit terms, the jury is required
by the traditional standard to think in lump terms, and to measure the
size of the whole without reference to the size of its parts.7 9 Their approach, of weighing the merits of the traditional standard against the
merits of the per diem technique, is best summed up in the Flowers case,
where the court, faced with the choice, opted for the per diem because:
It would seem that suggesting some concrete formula, although
it must be admitted to be purely a suggestion, in order to give
the jury some basis to arrive at its verdict is preferable to leaving it entirely at sea to fix a damage figure en masse "by guess
and by golly."" °
CONCLUSION
It would be pleasant to say that the attention given to the per diem
argument by the appellate courts of this country, since 1951, has ended
the controversy, and has produced a clear-cut pattern indicating the
trend of judicial thought. Unfortunately, the controversy continues, as
evidenced by two recent decisions which have upheld the use of the
technique.8 ' These decisions, while emphasizing the continuing virulence
of the problem, perhaps indicate as well that the pattern taking shape
portends greater liberality in the use of the argument.
A review of the historical background that underlies the issue, and
the arguments advanced by both sides, indicates that the problem does
not admit of easy solutions. Clearly, persuasive arguments can be
mustered to support either side of the debate, and the division of authority
78. Texas and New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1960).
79. NicHOLs, "Anti-Botta Thoughts in An Antibiotic Age," BELLI SEMINAR (1960).
80. Texas and New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Flowers, 336 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. 1960).
81. See, Beagle v. Vasold, P.2d (Cal. 1966) ; Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Insurance Co.,
F.2d (5th Cir. 1966).
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is still great enough that it affords little solace to believers in solving
legal problems by resorting to stare decisis. In the final analysis, the
personal predilections and background of the members of the reviewing
court probably are the decisive factors behind most of the decisions which
have recently been reported. The complete airing of all sides of the
debate, which has resulted because of the concentration on the problem
in the last decade, has prevented any single argument from gaining
sufficient force to persuade a court looking for an intellectual solution
to the alternating contentions.
In this article, no attempt has been made to advocate one side over
the other, or to denigrate either side of the controversy. Instead, it is
hoped that this exposition of the historical development of the problem,
and review of the positions maintained by each side, will shed some light
on the nature of the controversy, and clarify the ramifications of the
problem.

